Redstate

By Jeff Emanuel Posted in Capitulation | Media | new york times | Surrender to win | War — Comments (5) / Email this page » / Leave a comment »

Note: This piece appeared in today's New York Times under the title "Colombia's chance." For the sake of illustrating absurdity, the word "Colombia" has been changed to "Iraq," and "FARC" to "al Qaeda in Iraq."

See if it sounds any better to you like this, than it does in the original editorial calling on Colombian President Uribe to capitulate to FARC rather than defeat them outright.

Iraq’s president, Nouri Al-Maliki, may be sorely tempted to begin a final, killing offensive against fighters of al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQI. The fighters are weakened, and Mr. Al-Maliki is eager to capitalize politically on their defeat.

Nevertheless, he should resist that temptation and seek a political settlement to try to bring the fighters in from the cold. Iraq has seen more than enough bloodshed. And Mr. Al-Maliki has a strong enough hand to insist on AQI's complete disarmament and an end to the attacks on civilians that has long been the group's main mission.

Al Qaeda has been under assault from Iraqi Security Forces, first led, then increasingly supported, by U.S. forces Army for some four years, and looks as if it is unraveling. It has lost several of its top commanders in recent years, including Abu-Musab al Zarqawi in 2006.

Read on.

According to another rebel commander who turned herself in last month, AQI's lines of command and communication are broken and some units are isolated. There is also talk of a power struggle to replace lost leaders that could split AQI into rival fiefs.

The guerrillas that flocked to Iraq from Afghanistan and the greater Middle East still remain a substantial fighting force — with several thousand members and steady financing from individuals and governments. They also hold several hostages. The hostages likely would be killed in any final assault. AQI — which not 2 years ago was at the gates of Baghdad, the capital — must now realize that it cannot win. Within tightly limited constraints, the Iraqi government should take advantage of AQI's weakness to press for a political settlement.

Shi’a paramilitaries have been demobilized under a plan that offered commanders lenient prison sentences in exchange for confessions and turning over ill-gotten assets. Foot soldiers were offered training and stipends to rejoin Iraqi society. AQI leaders, which still see themselves as a political movement, are unlikely to accept these terms. While those guilty of the most serious crimes should face Iraqi justice, Mr. Al-Maliki should consider offering the fighters a role in Iraqi politics.

He should also put aside any hope of capitalizing on a AQI defeat to increase his chances of amending reelection. The Middle East has far too much experience with strongmen — including Mr. Al-Maliki's nemesis and patron of the insurgency, Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The region doesn't need a strongman. Iraq needs an end to the fighting and a chance to build an even stronger, peaceful democracy.

Now, does this make sense, or sound like advice that should even be slightly considered?

I didn't think so. With this editorial, the New York Times has simply succeeded in reaffirming its proclivity for self-beclowning. Well done.